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RECENT CASES
the operation of sovereign immunity, 54 and the availability of dam-
ages.55 Rules which always place the burdens of proof on the bailee
have recently been adopted by several states in well-reasoned opin-
ions.56 The Missouri Supreme Court should consider the issue and do
the same. Under such a rule, the outcome of bailment actions would




REMITTING PARTY TO CROSS-APPEAL
Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. '
A trial judge may reduce a jury verdict he deems excessive, and avoid
granting a new trial, by ordering a remittitur. This is a procedure whereby
the defendant's motion for a new trial is denied by the trial court if the
plaintiff agrees to accept a specified reduction in the jury's award. Under the
common law rule, a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur to avoid undergoing a
new trial is precluded on appeal from complaining of the insufficiency of the
judgment awarded him.2 This rule recently was modified in Missouri in
Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
In Means the plaintiff brought an action to recover for personal injuries
and won a jury verdict of $65,000. The trial judge ordered a
remittitur of $25,000, which the plaintiff accepted. The defendant ap-
pealed, raising the excessiveness of the judgment; the plaintiff cross-ap-
pealed, seeking reinstatement of the original verdict. The St. Louis District
of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the plaintiff's remitted recovery.
may have different statutory periods for the respective actions and rules may vary as
to when the statute starts to run.
54. See Jurisich v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 8 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 1942) (a
contract action for damage to a bailed airplane was successfully pursued because the
governmental bailee's sovereign immunity precluded an action in tort).
55. Punitive damages are much more likely in a tort action than in a contract
action. For a recovery of punitive damages in a bailment situation, see Brown v.
Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., 296 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1956) (bailor joined action on
bailment contract with claim for fraud; a successful claim for punitive damages was
based on the latter).
56. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
1. 550 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1327, 1329 (1967).
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
However, the court recognized the need to reconsider the Missouri rule
which prohibits a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur from arguing for a
reinstatement of the original verdict and transferred the case to the Missouri
Supreme Court for a reexamination of this rule. The supreme court af-
firmed the court of appeals decision but modified the common law remit-
titur rule and held that when the plaintiff has accepted a remittitur in the
trial court and the defendant raises the issue of the excessiveness of the
award on appeal, the plaintiff may then request review of the remittitur
order, i.e., may ask for reinstatement of the original verdict.3
The approach taken by Missouri courts prior to Means is illustrated in
Carver v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R. 4 The jury awarded $67,500 for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's husband. The trial judge ordered a remittitur of
$15,000 as a condition to overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff accepted the remittitur and judgment was entered for the
remitted verdict. On appeal the defendant assigned as error the excessive-
ness of the damages awarded. The plaintiff also appealed and sought to have
the jury verdict reinstated. He asserted that the remittitur was under the
compulsion of a final order which would sustain the defendant's motion for
a new trial.
The court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal
and held that once a plaintiff has accepted a remittitur he cannot question its
validity. In answering the plaintiff's assertion that the remittitur order was
under compulsion, the court explained that remittitur orders are construed
as effectively granting the defendant a new trial due to the excessiveness of
the verdict. The plaintiff has the power, however, to surrender that part of
the judgment considered excessive and thereby defeat the defendant's new
trial. The exercise of this power by the plaintiff is a voluntary election to
accept the remittitur. The court also noted, citing Counts v. Thompson, 5 that
the remittitur practice was instituted for the benefit of injured plaintiffs so
that a judgment for a proper amount could be entered, and the delay and
expense of a new trial thus could be avoided.
In Carver the court relied on the authority of United States Supreme
Court cases, 6 cases from other jurisdictions, 7 and legal encyclopedias.8
3. 550 S.W.2d at 789. The court did not comment on a more liberal rule, also
suggested by the plaintiff, whereby the defendant also would be required to consent
upon the entry of a remittitur; if the defendant did not consent, the remittitur order
would be vacated. The defendant then could take an appeal, but the appeal would be
from the original verdict and not from the '.erdict after remittitur.
4. 362 Mo. 897, 245 S.W.2d 96 (1952). See also Webb v. Rench, 476 S.W.2d 570
(Mo. 1972).
5. 359 Mo. 485, 222 S.W.2d 487 (1949).
6. Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Min. Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Kennon v.
Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889).
7. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Ruckles, 83 Fla. 599,92 So. 159 (1922); McDaniel v.
Hancock, 328 Mich. 78, 43 N.W.2d 68 (1950).
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RECENT CASES
Although the court declined to comment on the reasoning behind these
authorities, there is some logic in the common law rule. Whether the prohib-
ition on appeal is couched in terms of waiver, 9 estoppel,' 0 or lack of stand-
ing,'" the basic idea is that one may not appeal from ajudgment to which he
has consented.' 2 This logic, however, is not without limits. If the purpose
behind allowing the plaintiff to remit a portion of the verdict is settlement of
the issue of damages,' 3 this purpose of the remittitur procedure is negated
when the defendant appeals the issue of damages. This was the concept
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Means when it reasoned that in
acceding to a remittitur the plaintiff should be able to assume that the issue
of damages is settled. When that issue is kept alive by the defendant's appeal,
"the whole issue of what remittitur, if any, is required should be open for
consideration by the appellate court." 14
With the Means decision Missouri departs from the general rule that a
plaintiff cannot challenge the propriety of a remittitur order after accepting
it, and aligns itself with a significant minority of jurisdictions which allow
some type of appellate review of a remittitur order. Although some of these
otherjurisdictions permit review by statute or procedural rule,'5 some have
provided for review through judicial decision. 16
The decision in Plesko v. City of Milwaukee '7 has been a substantial
influence in jurisdictions which have reconsidered the common law rule.
Thejury inPlesko returned a $9,950 verdict for the plaintiff. The trial court
found the verdict excessive and ordered a remittitur of $4,450 which plain-
tiff accepted. On appeal, the court held that a plaintiff who has accepted a
remittitur is not precluded from obtaining appellate review of such remit-
titur when the defendant appeals. The plaintiff's right to cross-appeal was
limited to instances where the defendant has appealed; it was not extended
to allow a direct appeal by the plaintiff. However, Plesko would allow review
of the remittitur order even though the defendant does not raise the issue of
damages on appeal' 6s
9. E.g., San Bernardino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618, 67 P. 1047
(1902); Plinsky v. Nolan, 65 Or. 402, 133 P. 71 (1913).
10. E.g., Florida East Coast Ry. v. Ruckles, 83 Fla. 599, 92 So. 159 (1922);
McDaniel v. Hancock, 328 Mich. 78, 43 N.W.2d 68 (1950); Martin v. Jansen, 113
Wash. 290, 193 P. 674 (1920).
11. E.g., Gough v. Halperin, 306 Pa. 230, 159 A. 447 (1932).
12. Note, Civil Procedure-Remittitur-Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal, 49
N.C.L. REv. 141, 143 (1970).
13. Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
14. 550 S.W.2d at 789.
15. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1929 (1943); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW. § 5501(a)(5) (McKin-
ney 1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955); TEX. R. Civ. P. 328 (1975).
16. Mulkerin v. Somerset Tire Serv., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 173, 264 A.2d 748(1970); Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130 (1963). For a
review of federal court decisions, see Note, Appealability ofJudgments Entered Pursuant
to Remittiturs in Federal Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150.
17. 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130, 16 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1963).
18. Id. at 220, 120 N.W.2d at 135, 16 A.L.R.3d at 1324.
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Concurring in Means, then Chief Judge Seiler argued for the adop-
don of the Plesko rule in Missouri. The language quoted from Plesko
illustrates that the purpose of remittitur in Wisconsin is to avoid the
delay and expense of a new trial or appeal; when a defendant appeals,
this purpose is neutralized. What is overlooked is the fact that the stated
purpose of remittitur is not exactly the same in Missouri.' 9 Judge Finch
commented on that point in a separate concurring opinion in Means
where he argued against the adoption of the Plesko rule. In that opinion
Judge Finch stated that "[t]he remittitur practice never was intended td
serve as a complete answer to all objections raised by a defendant in a
motion for a new trial after a plaintiff has obtained a verdict. It was
intended to address only the assertion that the verdict is excessive."' 20
If, after the plaintiff has accepted a remittitur, the defendant appeals on
issues other than the excessiveness of the damages, the remittitur still serves
a useful function in settling the issue of damages. This function is not upset
by the defendant's appeal on other issues. Furthermore, as suggested by
Judge Finch, to allow the plaintiff (a nonappealing party) to possibly recover
the remitted portion of his original verdict when the issue of damages is not
raised by the defendant's appeal would serve to penalize the defendant for
taking his appeal and would be unfair.21 If the remittitur has cured an
excessive verdict in the trial court, it has served its function. The defendant
still has a statutory right to appeal the issues he believes deserve attention
which were not cured by the remittitur, and it would seem that he should be
free to exercise this right without fear of penalty.
Therefore, as was approved in Means, to allow the plaintiff to cross-ap-
peal the insufficiency of the damages award when the defendant has kept
the issue of damages alive on appeal conforms to the basic purpose of the
remittitur practice. Extending this rule further and allowing a cross-appeal
of the damages issue when the defendant's appeal does not concern damages
may comport with the Wisconsin rationale of remittitur but not that of
Missouri.
AfterMeans v. Sears a plaintiff confronted with a remittitur order in the
trial court will have a new element to consider. If the plaintiff decides to
accept the remittitur, there are three possible courses of events.
First, the defendant could be satisfied with the remitted verdict and not
appeal, thereby allowing the plaintiff immediate recovery.
Second, the defendant could decide to appeal and raise the issue of
damages; the Means decision permits the plaintiff to seek review of the
19. See Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. En Banc 1973) where
it is noted that the remittitur doctrine is useful is keeping damages from exceeding an
upper limit of reasonable compensation, and sometimes avoids the granting of new
trials which result in delay, uncertainty, and additional expense.
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original remittitur order. The appellate court may approve the remittitur, as
inMeans; the court may order a new trial on damages alone or on all issues,22
with or without a power in the plaintiff to defeat the order for new trial by
accepting further remittitur; or the court may order reinstatement of part or
all of the original jury verdict.23
Third, the defendant may appeal on issues other than damages, in
which case the plaintiff cannot get review of the trial court's remittitur
order.
2 4
If the plaintiff refuses the remittitur there are two possibilities.
First, the plaintiff could undergo a new trial hoping for a verdict which
meets or exceeds the original damages award.
Second, the plaintiff may appeal the order granting a new trial.2 5 If the
plaintiff appeals this order and wins, the original verdict may be
reinstated.26 Otherwise, there is some indication that the appellate court
could find that a remittitur was in order, but that the trial court abused its
discretion as to the amount, and enter a new verdict.27 If the plaintiff loses
his appeal, a new trial is ordered.2 8 In the case of a lost appeal, the plaintiff
may not then decide to accept the remittitur, except in certain cir-
cumstances.
29
Each of these alternatives has a practical basis for existing, and the
well-reasoned decision in Means v. Sears has not upset the logic underlying
them. However, the suggested extension of remittitur practice to allow the
plaintiff on cross-appeal to complain that the remittitur order was improper,
even when the defendant has not raised the issue of damages on appeal, is
not so well supported in reason. This consideration, coupled with the fact
that the Missouri Supreme Court already has rejected a more liberal rule,30
makes it likely that, if faced with the possibility of adopting the Plesko rule,
the court will decline to do so.
BRADLEYJ. BAUMGART
22. DeMoulin v. Kissir, 446 S.W.2d 162 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
23. This is the possibility added by Means v. Sears.
24. In this situation, then ChiefJudge Seiler would allow review of the remittitur
order. 550 S.W.2d at 792 (Seiler, C.J., concurring).
25. § 512.020, RSMo 1969.
26. Sanders v. Illinois Central R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 270 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc
1954).
27. C. WHEATON, Civil Rules Practice, 17 MISSOURI PRACTICESERIES 562 n.37 (1976).
28. Weis v. Wanstrath, 149 S.W.2d 442 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
29. Deaner v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 484 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1972) (the defendant's
only argument in favor of sustaining the new trial order was the excessiveness of
damages); Greco v. Hendricks, 327 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1959) (trial court's new trial
order was on inconsistent grounds); Nix v. Gulf Mobile & O.R.R., 362 Mo. 187, 240
S.W.2d 709 (1951); Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 1066, 238
S.W.2d 426 (En Banc 1951).
30. See note 3 supra.
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